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False Statements of Belief as Securities
Fraud
gy Wendy Gerwick Couture*
I. Introduction

Is a CEO's statement that "I believe the TVs we manufacture
have the highest resolution on the market"1 potentially action
able as an "untrue statement of material fact" under § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act2 and Rule 10b-53 promulgated there
under? If so, how does this statement map onto the elements of
securities fraud? Must the CEO actually disbelieve the state
ment? Must the matter addressed in the opinion—i.e., the resolu
tion of the company's TVs—actually be false? How does the CEO's
belief or disbelief intersect with the element of scienter? What
portion of this statement must be material to investors—the
CEO's expression of belief, the resolution of the company's TVs,
or both? When is the "truth" about the statement disclosed for
the purposes of assessing price impact and measuring loss—
when it is revealed that the CEO disbelieved his or her prioi
opinion or when it is revealed that the TVs did not have the
highest resolution on the market?
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Omnicare, Inc. v.
Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension un
provides guidance on these questions but also raises new issu .
In Omnicare, the Court charted a new course for opinions actio
able under § 11 of the Securities Act. The Court pronounced a
new test to differentiate statements of opinion fiom
m;<.reDrefact; held that a statement of opinion is actmna ® as . , ueijef
sentation of fact only if the speaker did not hold the stat^beliel
and if the matter addressed in the opinion is macc^ liability if a
that a statement of opinion can give rise to wnissi
conveying
reasonable investor would understand the opini
untrue facts about the basis for the opinion. ^
apply
An open question is whether Omnicare s^a6Cgome courts
equally to opinions actionable as securities r
^ "alterna
te applied Omnicare to securities fraud claim
it * 0ther
tive analysis,"7 as "instructive,"8 or as persuasi
securities
courts have simply assumed that Omnicare
fraud claims.10
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II

The Holdings in Omnicare

Tn Omnicare the Supreme Court addressed whether purchas
er in a public offering by Omnicare had stated a claim under
§ 11 based on the following statements m the registration

statement:
• "We believe our contract arrangements with other healthcare
providers, our pharmaceutical suppliers and our pharmacy
practices are in compliance with applicable federal and sta e
• "We believe that our contracts with pharmaceutical manufac
turers are legally and economically valid arrangements that
bring value to the healthcare system and the patients that
12
we
vvc serve."
oui vu.
.10 11
The purchasers alleged that these statements violated § 1
because Omnicare's receipt of payments from drug manufactur
ers violated anti-kickback laws and because none of Omnicare s
officers and directors "possessed reasonable grounds" for the belie
that they were in legal compliance.13

The district court granted Omnicare's motion to dismiss, the
Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
"to consider how § 11 pertains to statements of opinion.
First, the Court classified these statements as opinions rather
than as statements of fact. Despite the fact that lower cour s
have struggled mightily to differentiate statements of opinion
from statements of fact for purposes of liability under the securi
ties laws,15 the Court characterized the discussion as "a mite
silly." The Court relied on the definitions of "fact" and "op^1^11
in two English dictionaries, published in 1927 and 1933. Ac
cording to the Court, a fact is "a thing done or existing^' °r
actual happening" and "expresses certainty about a thing,
opinion is "a belieff,] a view" or "a sentiment which the mm^
forms of persons and things" and does not express certainty352
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Court characterized the difference in level of certainty be
tween a statement of fact and a statement of opinion as the
"[mlost important difference.19 Applying this test to the state
ments at issue in the case the Court focused on the introductory
words "I believe and held that the statements, which did not
express certainty, were "pure statements of opinion."20
Second, the Court held that an opinion can be actionable as "an
untrue statement of a material fact" under § 11 only if the
speaker did not hold the stated belief. According to the Court,
because a statement of opinion lacks certainty, it explicitly af
firms only one fact: "that the speaker actually holds the stated
belief."21 The Court added a caveat, however: even if the speaker
did not hold the stated belief, the opinion would not be actionable
as a misstatement of fact if the matter addressed in the opinion
were accurate.22 Here, where the purchasers did not contest that
Omnicare's opinions were honestly held, the Court held that they
were not actionable as untrue statements of material fact.23
Third, the Court held that an opinion, even if not actionable as
an untrue statement of material fact, potentially gives rise to li
ability under § 11 if the speaker "omitted to state a material fact
necessary to make [the opinion] not misleading."24 As the
Court explained, "a reasonable investor may, depending on the
circumstances, understand an opinion statement to convey facts
about how the speaker has formed the 0Pini0n-°r,,'250i)?erw^
put about the speaker's basis for holding that view
This is a
contextual inquiry that examines the opinion from the perspec
tive of a reasonable investor:
The investor must identify
the basis for the issuer's
did not havedid or did not conduct or the know &
^ .ggue misieading to

The

fairiy

^in c:ntext 26

ns

Because neither court below
the judgment
27
theory under this standard, t
pr proceedings.
below and remanded the case or
twQ portions of the
This essay analyzes the impact ot th
how are statements
Omnicare opinion on securities rau .
Wact for purposes of
of opinion differentiated from s a
• ion actionable as a false
securities fraud? Second, w^en 1S
iOb-5? And, finally, if a
statement of fact under § 10(b) an
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III. The Distinction Between Stateme

Statements of Opinion
statements of opinion from
Omnicare's new test to differentiate state
^
©2015 Thomson Reuters . Securities Regulation Law Journal .W.nter 2015

S E C U R I T I E S R E G U L A T I O N L A W JOURNAL

ff*rt likely applies equally to securities fraud claims.
in 0mmcare suggests that its
the
C
Nothing m
, ° rnnfined to § 11- Rather, the Court relied on
-opinion test is; t
^ explain the distinction between a
two English mcLon
ment of opinion and reasoned that,
statement of fact an
under § n for "untrue statements]
by exposing issuers
incorporated this "everyday"
of • • ' faC28'p %h 5 like § 11, prohibits "untrue statement[s]
dlStioHact," and thus'likely incorporates this same "everyday-

statements of fact liKeiy PE •
fact

distinction.
claims, Omnicare's new fact-opinion
Applied to secur
. distinguish statements of fact from
test will f^nge how courts d'stmgu^^ ^ ^
.
statements ofopm ^
mary approach!es 1to
f

^ distinction: the "I know it when I
judgment or subjectivity

et"' The3
combmatro/of the literal test and
f • ^ent or subjectivity test. Like the judgment or subjectivb ^ i a

the

speakers

Test

is a

mental Proces^.

^ things."31 At the same
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°PAfter'Omnicare, although one court has suggested
it ferns clear that a statement of fact can be transformed mto a
statement of opinion merely by adding the PreJ?
fact-opinion
believe." The Court provided two examples of the tact; p ^
distinction, and the inclusion of such an mtroducto y p
^
outcome-determinative in each example. In the first
P > ^
Court characterized "the coffee is hot" as a statemen
cond
"I think the coffee is hot" as a statement of opinion. In tne
example, the Court characterized "the TVs wemanu ac
, 0f
the highest resolution available on the market as a s a
^
fact and "I believe the TVs we manufacture have the
olution available on the market" as a statement o op
^
Therefore, post-Omnicare, issuers and their agents will 1 josures>
such introductory language more frequently in public dis
to the extent permitted by the disclosure rules and borne
market-36
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• e true:
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if an inherently uncertain statement is expressed wi
^a
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on Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg which arose under
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 promul
gated thereunder, for this caveat.48 In that case, quoting a district
court case interpreting § 10(b), the Court held that "to recognize
liability on mere disbelief or undisclosed motive without any
demonstration that the proxy statement was false or misleading
about its subject would authorize § 14(a) litigation confined solely
to what one skeptical court spoke of as the 'impurities' of a
director's 'unclean heart.' "49 According to the Virginia Bankshares
Court, permitting liability on this basis would "threaten just the
sort of strike suits and attrition by discovery that Blue Chip
Stamps [a case interpreting § 10(b)) sought to discourage."50 Vir
ginia Bankshares's holding, which itself relied on § 10(b) prece
dent, is at least as persuasive in § 10(b) actions as in § 11 actions.
Like § 11, claims under Rule 10b-5 are premised on "untrue state
ment^] of material fact."51 Further, the Court has explicitly
adopted the materiality standard from § 14(a) for claims under
§ 10(b).52
Therefore, post-Omnicare, a statement of opinion is likely ac
tionable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a false statement of fact
only if (1) the speaker did not hold the stated belief (i.e., the
opinion was subjectively false) and (2) the matter addressed in
the opinion was not accurate (i.e., the opinion was objectively
false).53 This resolves the pre-Omnicare split in authority,
whereby some courts required both subjective and objective
falsity in order for a statement of opinion to be actionable as se
curities fraud and other courts merely required objective falsity.54
Post-Omnicare, a statement of opinion must be both subjectively
and objectively false in order to be actionable as securities fraud.
An interesting question post-Omnicare is whether, in order for
an opinion to be objectively false (as required by the Virginia
Bankshares caveat), it is sufficient for the matter addressed in
e opinion to be objectively unreasonable, even if it is not
demonstrably false. Unfortunately, by giving short shrift to the
distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion,
* Omnicare Court failed to recognize the possibility that the
addressed in an opinion might be inherently uncertainU
^pfh i mclpahle of being proven true or false—and yet might
nonetheless be objectively unreasonable. The subject matter of
canah^nf^ •
Omnicare Court chose as an example is
rather flir, emfi Pr«oen ^se' tbus allowing the Court to state
companv^W^1° ^ °Ur CE0 did not believe that her
(surprise')
n ^highest resolution on the market, but
statement "55 Tf th r
u 11 would not impose liability for her
Eourt
opinion WWP W
bad instead chosen as an example an
subject matter is inherently uncertain (such as the
2015 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Winter 2015
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causal relationship between a drug and a MPHIR.OI
J-J.nj
based on inconclusive data), the Court would have r^
that the subject matter of an opinion might not be demon
false but might nonetheless b/objective^
mg liability for a disbelieved objectively unreasonable opinTon
does not merely punish "the 'impurities' of a director's Wle*n
^ ,b6tter ™Ie Po«t-Omratconsis'TRNT
with the Virginia Bankshares caveat, is to recognize that the
objective falsity requirement is satisfied if the matter addressed
in the opinion is either demonstrably false or objectively
unreasonable.57

XSf

V. Other Elements of a Securities Fraud Claim Based on
a False Statement of Belief
Post-Omnicare, a statement of belief is potentially actionable
as a false statement of fact under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if (1) the
speaker disbelieved the opinion expressed and (2) the matter ad
dressed in the opinion was inaccurate. In order for such a state
ment to form the basis of a securities fraud claim, however, the
other elements of securities fraud must also be satisfied: scienter,
materiality, reliance, and loss causation. As discussed below,
these elements—whose contours are fairly well-settled in the
context of other types of false statements—pose new challenges
when applied to false statements of belief.
A. Scienter
When a securities fraud action is premised on an allegedly
false statement of belief, two elements of the claim relate to the
speaker's state of mind. As discussed above, the element of falsity
requires the speaker to have actually disbelieved thesopinion
expressed, contrary to the speaker's expression of belief. \ e e "
ement of scienter requires the speaker to have made a ^ a se
statement about his or her state of mind at least reckless yissue is whether, in order to satisfy the strong mfereHceol scien
ter pleading standard,60 a plaintiff must plea^ any
ffUg
facts other than those that support the speaker s 1
opinion stated.
, .
„ i^110tPiv
The better rule is to recognize that, if the.p am 1 ^ ^ ^ not
pleads that a speaker expressed an op^mn
inference of
in fact hold, the plaintiff has also P^
it is
scienter. Absent some sort of out
s tbe contents of
inconceivable that a speaker could fa
y
recklessly. As the
his or her own brain without doing s
Reynolds: "[Clertain
Supreme Court recognized m Merc felse
is normally to show
statements are such that, to show
i t^at someone would
scienter as well. It is unlikely
of the fact
falsely say 'I am not married' without being
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that his statement is false."61 One is equally as likely to know the
contents of one's own brain as one s marital status, and thus mis.
stating either should support a strong inference of scienter. This
commonsense rule is a logical extension of the core operations
inference" whereby allegations about a statement s falsity may
be sufficient to allege a strong inference of management's scienter
"where the nature of the relevant fact is of such prominence that
it would be 'absurd' to suggest that management was without
knowledge of the matter."62 This rule is also perhaps the purest
example of what this essay's author has previously dubbed the
"falsity-scienter inference," whereby "the well-pleaded falsity of a
statement is sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter
when (1) the truth is necessarily within the speaker's core knowl
edge; and (2) the statement is sufficiently false to have necessar
ily caught the speaker's attention."63 Indeed, consistent with this
rule, post-Omnicare courts have recognized that the elements of
falsity and scienter merge when applied to allegedly false state
ments of belief.64
B. Materiality
As the Omnicare Court acknowledged in passing, a speaker's
false statement of fact—that he or she believed the opinion
expressed—must be materially misleading in order to be
actionable.65 This raises an interesting question: when is there a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would find the
speakers expression of belief about the matter addressed in the
opinion to be important when making an investment decision?66
There are three possible materiality scenarios, only the third of
which is tenable.
First, a reasonable investor could arguably find a speaker's
false statement of belief to be important because a reasonable in
vestor values candor from the officers and directors of companies
in which he or she invests. Although this articulation has some
logical appeal, courts should reject this materiality argument as
an impermissible merging of falsity and materiality. If this
articulation were successful, a speaker's misrepresentation of
belief about anything—even the paint color on the board room's
walls—would arguably be material. The Court rejected this
bootstrapping of materiality to falsity in Basic Inc. v. Levinson 67
e ixth Circuit had held that "information concerning ongoing
acquisition discussions becomes material by virtue of the state
ment denying their existence,"68 The Basic Court rejected the Sixth
Circuits analysis: "This approach, however, fails to recognize
^'
°r(Jar t0 Prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must
w at the statements were misleading as to a material fact.
a s^a^oment is false or incomplete, if the
milt n0 en(?Uf^srepresented fact is otherwise insignificant." Therefore, a state358
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ment of belief, if not independently material, does not become so
merely because it is false.
™ so
Second a reasonable investor could arguably find a speaker's
false statement of belief to be important because (1) the matter
addressed m the opinion is actually accurate and (2) the speaker's
disbelief of the matter addressed in the opinion would demon
strate that the speaker is uninformed or incompetent. The Vir
ginia Bankshares caveat, which requires the subject matter of
the opinion to be objectively false,69 forecloses this materiality
argument.
Third, a reasonable investor could arguably find a speaker's
statement of belief to be important because it makes it more
likely that the matter addressed in the opinion is accurate. To
use the Omnicare Court's example, a reasonable investor could
find it important when making an investment decision that a
CEO stated "I believe that the TVs we manufacture have the
highest resolution available on the market" because the CEO's
expression of belief makes it more likely that company's TVs
actually have the highest resolution.
The materiality analysis is thus a two-step inquiry. First, is
the subject matter addressed in the opinion important to a rea
sonable investor? Second, if so, does the speaker's expression of
belief convey meaningful information to a reasonable investor
about the likelihood that the subject matter is accurate?
The first step of this materiality inquiry is straightforward. For
example, take a CEO's statement that "I believe the TVs we
manufacture have the highest resolution available on the
market." The first step of the materiality inquiry should focus on
whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would find the resolution of the company's TVs to be important
when making an investment decision—likely depending on
percentage of revenues associated with TV sa es
if the
importance of a TVs resolution to consumers Bycontrast if t
CEO had expressed an opinion about, the foodI offered m feem
ployee cafeteria, the opinion would likely ai
stor wouid
r®®s°
materiality inquiry because
king an investment
consider that information important when mam g
deThe°second

step of this materiality inquiry
factors. First, is the speaker someone
^ subject matter
tor would expect to possess informai i
jnvestor likely would
of the opinion? For example a
onable mv^ ^
P
expect the CEO to be informed about t
h HR director to
tors' products but probably would not expect
possess that information.
much tentativeness
Second, is the opinion expressed with
m
^
rea
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that a reasonable investor would not interpret it as making the
subject matter more likely? For example if the CEO had stated
"Tactually have no idea, but I believe hat the TVs we manufac
ture have the highest resolution available on the market," then a
reasonable investor would probably not interpret the CEO's
opinion as conveying meaningful information about the resolu
tion of the company's TVs.
Third is the basis for the opinion disclosed and available to
investors, such that a reasonable investor could reach his or her
own independent conclusion about the subject matter of the
opinion? If so, the expression of belief would not convey any
meaningful information to a reasonable investor, who could reach
his or her own opinion. For example, if the CEO had stated
"Based on the advertising materials from our five largest competi
tors, I believe that the TVs we manufacture have the highest res
olution on the market," a reasonable investor would not interpret
the CEO's expression of belief as conveying any meaningful infor
mation about the likelihood that the company's TVs indeed pos
sess the highest resolution. A reasonable investor could assess
the quality of the research performed by the CEO and make his
or her own determination about whether the company's TVs have
the highest resolution. (Of course, if the advertising materials
actually reflected that a competitor's TV had a higher resolution,
the embedded factual statement within the opinion would
potentially be actionable as a false statement of fact.70) As this
author has previously argued, courts making this assessment
should draw on the deep body of case law developed in the context
of defamation, which differentiates opinions that imply undis
closed defamatory facts from those that do not (usually because
the factual basis for the opinion is stated).71
There is an interesting overlap between the second step of the
materiality analysis in a false statement of belief case and the
analysis of potential omissions liability under Omnicare. Under
Omnicare, in addition to being potentially actionable as a false
statement of belief, an opinion can give rise to omissions liability
if a reasonable investor would understand the opinion statement
as conveying untrue facts about the speaker's basis for holding
that view.72 As the Court explained, "[t]o avoid exposure for omis
sions under § 11, an issuer need only divulge an opinion's basis,
or else make clear the real tentativeness of its belief."73 Therefore,
it a speaker states the basis for his or her opinion or expresses
sufficient tentativeness, the opinion is neither actionable as a
aise statement of fact—because the second step of the materiali y analysis fails—nor as a misleading omission—because no reaS r would understand the opinion as conveying
facts about the speaker's basis for that opinion. On the

1 V? !°
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flip side, however, it may be easier for a plaintiff to plead facts in
support of the second step of the materiality analysis than to
plead actionable omissions. In order to plead the second step of
the materiality analysis, a plaintiff need only plead facts in sup
port of the proposition that the speaker's expression of belief
conveyed meaningful information to a reasonable investor about
the likelihood that the subject matter is accurate. In order to
plead an omissions claim, however, a plaintiff must "identify par
ticular (and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer's
opinion . . . whose omission makes the opinion statement at is
sue misleading."74
C. Reliance and Loss Causation
Finally, pinpointing the moment that the purported "truth" is
disclosed to the market is potentially relevant to the elements of
reliance and loss causation. If the plaintiffs are relying on the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the defendants
may try to rebut the presumption by producing evidence of a lack
of "price impact."75 The defendants may seek to accomplish this
by showing that the disclosure of the "truth" did not impact the
market price.76 Likewise, in order to demonstrate loss causation,
plaintiffs often attempt to show that the stock price dropped
upon disclosure of the "truth."77
If a securities fraud claim is premised on a false statement of
belief about a subject matter, there are two potential moments
that the "truth" is disclosed to the market: (1) when the market
discovers that the speaker actually disbelieved the earlierexpressed opinion; or (2) when the market discovers that the
matter addressed in the opinion was inaccurate..te the
matter the former "truth" would rarely be disclosed to the
market'. Rather, the company would likely f ™
"Although we believed that our TVs had tiie, highest
the market, we have now discovered that one of our competi
TVs has a higher resolution."
inaccuracy
The better analysis is to treat the
of
the
of the matter addressed m
lge opini0n. Under this thethe risk" concealed by the speak
statement itself is not
aa^
ory, even if the truth
demonstrate i0Ss causation
am
revealed to the market, Pj
raused by the materialization of
if "the loss was foreseeable and caus
*
t
For example,
the risk concealed by the frau u
„ . jnc Securities Litiin the post-Omnicare case of'Inn*.ffg had t0 ii;point
gation, the defendants ar^e
h speaker actually disbelieve
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plead loss causation.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the disclosure of
the truth about the matter addressed in the opinion was suf
ficient to plead loss causation:
Although it is not clear what portion of the loss can be pegged to
BioScrip's prior misstatements as compared to the Government's
potential lawsuit, at the pleading stage a Plaintiff "need not demon
strate that defendants' misstatements or omissions caused all of
plaintiffs' losses. Rather, plaintiffs need only allege facts that would
allow a factfinder to ascribe some rough proportion of the whole
loss to [the defendant's alleged] misstatements." . . . Plaintiffs' al
legations ascribe some rough portion of the loss to the misstate
ments, particularly in light of the fact that, prior to the corrective
disclosure, the market had been entirely unapprised of the fact that
BioScrip was even involved in the Government's investigation into
Novartis , . . Plaintiffs have adequately plead that the loss was
foreseeable to BioScrip at the time they made the misstatements
and that the risk concealed materialized, and was exacerbated by,
BioScrip's misstatements.80

This is the better analysis, both as applied to loss causation and
to price impact.

VI. Conclusion
Hopefully, this essay will aid litigants, courts, market partici
pants, and scholars when analyzing allegedly false statements of
belief as false statements of fact under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
post-Omnicare. A separate question, also influenced by Omnicare,
is how to analyze whether an opinion gives rise to omissions li
ability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The author, and hopefully
other scholars, will engage in this line of inquiry in future work.

NOTES:
135

io a i k w ": ~"7T.'
ton, rea. sec. u. itep. iccn; i
(usinS thls statement as an example of an opinion).
215 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b).
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*Id. at 1325, 1326 and 1332.
6In re Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. Securities Litigation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) P 98581, 2015 WL 4469143, *10 n.7 (D.N.J. 2015) ("Given that Omnicare
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at 1326.
see Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America,
Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 98512, 2015 WL 2183875, *103 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
("Read in context, the use of the word 'believed' does not transform defendants'
representation regarding Fremont's compliance with its underwriting guidelines
into a statement of opinion. The first sentence is a straightforward statement of
fact. The reference to defendants' belief in the second sentence is little more
than a statement of assurance by defendants that they are correctly summariz
ing Fremont's guidelines . . . These 'statements of belief about an objective fact
. . . [do] not impose upon the plaintiff the duty to [prove] that the defendants
did not hold their expressed belief.'") (quoting Federal Housing Finance Agency
v. SG Americas, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 97210, 2012 WL 5931878, *2
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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36See

id. at 1335 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(stating that there are certain types of information-such as the cash on hand or
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tion actions . . . And the common law has long insisted that a plaintiff in such
a case show not only that had he known the truth he would not have acted but
also that he suffered actual economic loss.") (citing various treatises on torts
law).
4517

C.F.R. § 240.10-5(b).

46Accord

In re Petrobras Securities Litigation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P
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falsity of opinions to claims under § 12(a)(2)).
47Omnieare,

135 S. Ct. at 1326 n.2.

(citing Virginia Bankshares.Inc. v.
Ct. 2749, 115 L. Ed. 2d 929, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 96036 (1991))
49Virginia

Bankshares, Inc v. Sandberg,501 U.& 1083, 1

,

1U

g

Ct. 1917, 44 L. Ed. 2d 539, Fed. Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) P 95200,
(CCH)

60351 (1975) (interpreting § 10(b)L

5115

U.S.C.A. § 77k(a); 17 CM.
are premised on statements that are false or mislead g
material fact." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a- .

gg L

gd

2d

52Basic

Inc. u. Levinson, 485 U-S-224
- .
^ 961j io Fed. R.
194, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 93fi45. 24 Fe,from § 14(a) actions for
Serv. 3d 308 (1988) (adopting the materia y
securities fraud actions).
unlHine Am., Inc., No. H-£V53Accord Fed. Hous. Fin.
requiring the plmntiff to
6201, at *94 (S.D.N.Y. May U'20^ .^ed and that it was objectively false), prove both that an opinion was disbel ®^nd thus the LTV ratios-were fal ^
at *104 ("To show that the apprais
and subjective falsity. ,
FHFA was required to show both obje.^
*10-11
BioScrip, Inc. Securities Lltlg"-h'fTand claim and concluding f inion is ac(applying OmniCare toasec
preCedent that "a
both objectively
statem „
tent with the Second Circui
P
that the
a
PXDreSsed'") (quoting
tionable as securities fraud
P
(CCH) P
fendant at the time it was
false and disbelieved by the defendant a^ ^ ^ ped gec. L. Rep.
Fait v. Regions Financial Corp.,
96517 (2d Cir. 2011))(describing this split in aut
54Couture, supra note 15, a
55Omnicare,
56 Via.

135
^g ^ 1096 (citing Stedman v. Storer, 308
Bankshares, 501 U.S.
t

. securities Re9u.a«ion

©2015 Thomson Reuters • Se

Law Journ,. Winter 201

^

SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL

881 887, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 92551 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
57Accord

Nakkhumpun v. Taylor, 782 F.3d 1142 1159 Fed. Sec. L. Rep,
ircmp 98443 (10th Cir. 2015) ("An opinion is considered false if the speaker
does not actually or reasonably hold that opinion. ) (citing Omnicare)- but see /„
re Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. Security L.tiga ton, Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH) P
98581, 2015 WL 4469143, HOin. 7 (D.N.J. 2015) (describing objective falsity as
an "incoiTect" opinion) (citing Omnicare, 135 S.Ct. at 1326 & 1329).
560mnicare,

135 S. Ct. at 1326.

59See

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3
127 S Ct 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d 179, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 94335 (2007) ("We
have previously reserved the question whether reckless behavior is sufficient for
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 . . . Every Court of Appeals that has
considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter require
ment by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though
the Circuits differ on the degree of recklessness required . . . The question
whether and when recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement is not pre
sented in this case.").
6015

U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).

t'Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 650, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 176 L.
Ed. 2d 582, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 95733 (2010).
62South

Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 786, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) P 94833 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Berson v. Applied Signal Technology,
Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 988, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 94743 (9th Cir. 2008)).
63Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Falsity-Scienter Inference, 40 Sec. Reg. L.J.
303, 305 (2012).
64/rc re BioScrip, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2015 WL 1501620, *16 (S.D.
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considerations as those concerning the Defendants' statements of opinion . . .
Even if the direct equivalence between scienter and the pleading standard for
opinion statements does not hold in all circumstances, the Court concludes the
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged scienter as to the legal compliance state
ments . . . Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that BioScrip subjectively knew
about the CID, which identified conduct potentially implicating BioScrip in the
Government's investigation, yet nonetheless stated publicly that they were in
legal compliance."); Special Situations Fund III QP, L.P. v. Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu CPA, Ltd., 2015 WL 1474984, *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("As explained
above, however, these allegations are insufficient to establish scienter. They
likewise do not establish that DTTC subjectively knew its audit opinions to be
false.").

t e

®5Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326 ("In such cases, § ll's first part would subject
EO to liability (assuming the misrepresentation were material).").

"See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231 (holding that a fact is material "if there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to [invest]").
67Id.
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71Couture,

supra note 15, at 436-44.

720mnicare,
73Id.

135 S. Ct. at 1328.

at 1332.

74Id.
75Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417, 189 L.
Ed. 2d 339, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 98003, 88 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1472 (2014)
("[D]efendants must be afforded an opportunity before class certification to
defeat the presumption through evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did
not actually affect the market price of the stock.").
76Id.

at 2414 ("Basic itself 'made clear that the presumption was just that,
and could be rebutted by appropriate evidence,' including evidence that the as
serted misrepresentation (or its correction) did not affect the market price of the
defendant's stock.") (citation omitted and emphasis added).
77See

Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 347 ("The complaint's failure to claim
that Dura's share price fell significantly after the truth became known suggests
that the plaintiffs considered the allegation of purchase price inflation alone
sufficient.").
7*In re Omnicom Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, 597 F.3d 501, 513, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 95626 (2d Cir. 2010).
"Memorandum of Law in Support the Bioscrip Defendants' Mtaonto
Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re Bioscnp Inc. Securities
Litigation, 2014 WL 1677529 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations omitted).
80In

re BioScrip, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2015 WL 150162 ,
N.Y. 2015) (citations omitted).
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